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Michelle Pace
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ABSTRACT
Norway’s ambiguous approach towards Israel and Palestine can be
traced back to the 1940s when it was the most pro-Israeli of the
three Nordic countries. Since then, there has been a change in
perceptions of Israel amongst the Norwegian public and at the
official government level. The article follows this change through
four crucial phases: the first focuses on the period 1978 up until
1993; the second highlights the Oslo Accords period; the third
elucidates the Second Intifada phase and the fourth concentrates
on the time of the Gaza war of 2014 up to this day. While Middle
East events influenced Norwegian public opinion vis-à-vis Israeli
occupation of the Palestinian territory, policies of Norwegian
governments throughout these periods did not necessarily reflect
public opinion. Nowadays, the Norwegian government continues
to enhance its economic relations with Israel, in spite of the more
pro-Palestinian stance amongst the general public in Norway.
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This contribution traces the dramatic shifts and turning points over the decades in
Norway’s approach towards Israel and Palestine, in particular in regard to the former’s
occupation of Palestinian territory (OPT). It does this through an analysis of the changing
perceptions of Israel amongst the Norwegian public first from the period 1978–1993, then
at the time of the Oslo accords, followed by another pivotal historical moment – the
Second Intifada, as well as through the periods of expansion of Israeli settlements and
the 2014 Gaza war. In doing so this contribution traces the impact of these key events
on Norwegians’ (government and general public) stances on the Israeli occupation of
Palestinian lands. It argues that, in spite of what, on the surface, may appear as an ambig-
uous strategy of balancing relations between Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory
(OPT), Norway’s policies continue to enhance and deepen relations with the occupying
power. The article also highlights how the Norwegian government has de-coupled itself
from the EU in this regard, although Norway’s unilateralism and its independent line
from the EU on issues relating to Israel may well, in fact, be a feature of changing
governments.
Norway’s diplomatic relations with Israel kicked off in 1949 when Norway formally
recognized the State of Israel, which in turn contributed to the admission of the latter
as a full member of the United Nations. The Norwegian Labour Party (or AP for
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Arbeiderpartiet) held power from the first post-war elections in 1945 until the 1961 elec-
tions and had a pro-Israeli stance. For the majority of non-socialist and Christian Norwe-
gians the new Jewish state represented the fulfillment of Old Testament prophecies (NOU,
2000). In this context, the sale of Norwegian military equipment to Israel at that time was
broadly acceptable to the Norwegian (Israel-friendly) population. During this period,
Norway was in fact the most pro-Israeli of the three Nordic countries and, especially
throughout the 1950s, there was a close connection between Norwegian and Israeli
Social Democratic government parties.
This sympathetic attitude of the Labour Party towards Israel had not been entirely so
prior to 1949. In 1945, the creation of a Jewish state was considered by the AP to be neither
possible nor fair. The Party’s suggestion was a non-Zionist solution: the assimilation of the
Jews in their respective European countries. Norwegian historian Waage (2000) explains
the change in the AP’s position regarding Israel largely in terms of religious repentance.
On 20 November 1949 a plane carrying 27 Jewish children from Tunisia who were to
transit through Norway while immigrating to Israel, crashed due to bad weather at
Hurum. All children – except one – died. The crash was the second deadliest air disaster
in Norway at that time. Public sympathy ran high, and the secretary of the AP, Håkon Lie,
started a fundraising campaign to build a Norwegian village, the moshav Yanuv, in Israel.
Following the 1956 Suez crisis and until the 1967 war the majority of the Norwegian
population remained largely sympathetic towards Israel. But when Knut Frydenlund of
the AP became Foreign Minister in 1973, he played a decisive role in promoting the
demands of the Palestinians early on in his political career. In fact in 1974 Norway
made a controversial move by giving its support for PLO leader Yasser Arafat to speak
for the first time at the UN General Assembly (NUPI, 1974) clearly signaling to Israel
that Norway couldn’t be taken for granted in terms of its support for Israel and its
actions. However, in the same year, Norway was one of eight countries that voted
against granting the PLO observer status in the UN General Assembly. At the time, 87
of Norway’s 157 parliamentarians were members of what was called the Friends of
Israel Foundation (Damen, 2013). This attempt to pursue a balanced approach towards
both the Palestinians and the Israelis is a trait that marks the historical development of
Norway-Palestine-Israel relations, although on the one hand Norway’s public opinion
has moved towards a more pro-Palestinian position in more recent times and, on the
other, Norway’s policies have moved in the opposite direction.
Norway and changing perceptions of Israel amongst the Norwegian public
1978–1993
From 1978 Norway’s peacekeeping forces in southern Lebanon (as part of UNIFIL) had an
impact on the development of Norwegian attitudes towards the country’s relationship
with Israel. Thousands of Norwegian soldiers serving in UNIFIL had arrived in
Lebanon with sympathy for Israel: the perception of Israel of these soldiers however
changed to a much more critical one upon their return back home in Norway (Ness,
1989). The image of Israel also changed amongst several Norwegian politicians and jour-
nalists who witnessed at first hand the harassment of the Haddad forces. Moreover,
Norway’s foreign ministry was concerned about the safety of Norwegian UNIFIL
members (Damen, 2013).
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As Iran experienced its revolution in 1979, sending the oil markets in turmoil, Norway’s
position came into focus. Having relied on oil supplies from Iran prior to the revolution,
the US and Israel looked to Norway as an alternative supplier. Norwegian diplomat Hans
Longva discussed the matter with Yasser Arafat who supported the Norwegian plan to
guarantee an oil supply to Israel, on condition that the Norwegians would provide a
secret back channel to Israel when needed (Olsen, 2012). During the 1980s the AP
decided to reassess its views of the PLO: in December 1982 Frydenlund and other AP poli-
ticians had an unofficial meeting with Arafat in Tunis. In 1989 foreign minister Thorvald
Stoltenberg heralded a drastic shift through official talks with Arafat.
Stoltenberg managed to do this at a time when the public opinion climate in Norway
was more pro-Palestinian: times were shifting (Finnanger, 2015). In 1967, Norwegian
public debates referred to the ME conflict as one between Israel and the (slightly
vaguely defined) “Arab states” and therefore that at this time it was unthinkable for
Norway to acknowledge a Palestinian state. However, Norwegians’ opinions about the
ME conflict, perceptions of what the conflict is about and who the conflict parties involved
are changed between the period 1967 to 1984. This can be explained through a connection
between these changes and evolving events in the Middle East. During this period press
coverage of the ME conflict in Norway changed significantly as well. During the Six
Day 1967 war, coverage in VG (a foreign-owned Norwegian tabloid newspaper) and
Aftenposten (a moderately conservative newspaper) mainly held more sympathy with
Israel than with Egypt. At the time of the Lillehammer affair (21 July 1973) Mossad
agents mistook the identity of Ali Hassan Salameh (the target of their operation who
had been the chief perpetrator of the terrorist group Black September that had kidnapped
and murdered 11 Israeli athletes, officials and trainers at the Munich Olympics in 1972)
and killed Ahmed Bouchikhi, a Moroccan waiter and brother of the renowned musician
Chico Bouchikhi. The editors of VG and Aftenposten were reluctant to condemn Israel for
the murder. Six of the Mossad 15 member team were captured and convicted of complicity
in the murder by the Norwegian justice system. The coverage in Aftenposten and VG of
the 1973 Yom Kippur war also revealed a greater sympathy for the Israeli side than for
how Egyptians and Syrians experienced the war (Ibid.).
These two newspapers changed tone when in October 1978 it was announced that the
Nobel Peace Prize was to go to Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister
Menachem Begin. Aftenposten and VG questioned whether the prize should go to Sadat
alone given that it was he who had initiated a trip to Jerusalem in November 1977 and thus
it was Sadat who had paved the way for the Egypt-Israel peace treaty. Israel was also cri-
ticized for its second invasion of Lebanon in 1982 which was (as already mentioned
earlier) reinforced by the Norwegian contribution to UNIFIL.
This change of tone also reflected Norwegian public opinion. While in 1967 75% of
Norwegians polled reported that they supported Israel, in 1971 67% wanted Israel to
retreat to the borders of the pre-Six day war. A December 1973 poll shows that only
12.5% of respondents believed that Norway should support Israel. The late 1970s and
early 1980s were in fact marked by an overall decline in support for Israel in Norway (Fin-
nanger, 2015). However, this decline was not necessarily replaced by more sympathy for
Palestinians. This was probably due to the negative associations that respondents made
with the PLO. Following the 1967 war, press coverage in Norway was dominated by fre-
quent mention of conflicts in the ME region. This led to an impression amongst the public
GLOBAL AFFAIRS 3
that the conflict level in the ME was on the increase – an impression that reflected in the
low percentage of Norwegians that believed in the possibility of a peace agreement.
Stoltenberg’s 1989 opening of official talks with Arafat occurred at a time when most
Western countries held at a distance from the PLO, as the latter was designated as a ter-
rorist organization by the US and Israel until the Madrid Conference in 1991. While these
Norwegian moves signaled an appreciation and understanding of the rights of the Pales-
tinian people, Norway managed to successfully develop and navigate a relationship with
both Israel and the PLO, thus continuing its balancing act. In this way it created an
impression of neutrality which underpinned the basis for the “Oslo Agreement”, in
which Norway played an important role (or so it was thought).
Norway and the Oslo accords
Norway was the location where behind-the-scenes negotiations between the PLO and
Israel that led to the signing of the 1993 Declaration of Principles – also known as
the Oslo Accords – were held (Waage, 2002, 2004 and 2005). During this period
(1990–1997) Norway had a Labour government. The series of secret meetings in Oslo
were led by Terje Rød-Larsen, Mona Juul, Jan Egeland and Johan Jørgen Holst (then
Foreign Secretary). With this declaration, which was actually signed in Washington,
DC, the government of the state of Israel and the PLO team, representing the Palestinian
people, agreed to recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and to strive to
live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security. The ultimate aim of this
declaration was to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and his-
toric reconciliation through the agreed political process. The agreement led to the first
official recognition of Palestinian peoplehood and Palestinians’ rights by Israel.
However, there was no recognition of Israel as an occupier. Furthermore, there was
no “reference to the Palestinian right to self-determination or statehood” (Abu Amr,
1994, p. 78) in the Accords confirming that these accords were never meant to bring
about a sovereign State of Palestine (Milton-Edwards & Alastair, 2004; Pace & Sen,
in press; Persson, 2010).
Norway’s “crusader diplomacy” in the most intractable conflict in the Middle East
gained the country a lot of prestige and fame. Norway built up an image of a country
with moral integrity and a great conflict mediator firmly placing the country on the
highest levels of the international peace scene. Oslo specifically became known as the
world’s “capital of peace.” Peace mediation became one of Norway’s primary export ser-
vices. Norway’s “value-added component” also came to use in peace processes in Sri
Lanka, Cyprus, Sudan, Guatemala, Columbia and the former Yugoslavia (Bullion, 2001;
Hæglund & Svensson, 2002; Kelleher, 2006; Kelleher & Taulbee, 2006; Moolakkattu,
2005; Skånland, 2010).
However, the view of Norway amongst the majority of Palestinians, but especially
amongst the youth, was quite different, as it emerged from interviews and field obser-
vations held by the author, October 2014 in Gaza and during May, June and October
2016 in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. Far from being celebrated, Oslo was criticized
as the beginning of the end of any hope for meaningful Palestinian sovereignty and as the
main set up for the theatrical machinery of the Palestinian Authority as well as the perfor-
mativity surrounding the notion of a “Palestinian state” (Pace & Sen, in press). These
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perceptions resonated amongst Palestinians in diaspora, as expressed in interviews held by
the author in Copenhagen and London in May 2017.
The Oslo Accords have also been heavily criticized in Norway as raising a false hope for
peace in the Middle East. According to Waage (2008) – a renown expert on Norway-
Israel-Palestine relations – Norwegians were very naive to believe that through dialogue
and a gradual building of trust, an irreversible dynamic of peace would be created that
could push the process forward to a solution. Waage’s point is that the entire approach
missed the core issue at hand: Norway’s facilitative role did not address the power asym-
metry between Palestinians and Israelis. “In the end,” she argues, “the results that can be
achieved by a weak third-party facilitator are no more than the strong party will allow
(63).”
At the official level, however, Norway continued its balancing act of assisting Israelis
and Palestinians in achieving a supposedly “negotiated” agreement fulfilling the vision
of two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security. Norway also
persisted with its role as chair of the Donor Coordination Group (the Ad Hoc Liaison
Committee or AHLC), where both conflict parties participate actively. This can be under-
stood in the context of the political landscape in Norway which generally considers foreign
policy as a prerogative of the government, rather than a topic for political parties as such.
There is also a long-standing Norwegiantradition of consensus-oriented foreign policy.
The general line on the Israel-Palestine issue is just like that of the EU in that a) the occu-
pation is a problem, but the only way to solve it is through direct negotiations between the
conflict parties; b) the two-state solution is the only solution c) Norway has an important
role through the AHLC and cannot rock the boat because that would undermine that
influence.1
The Second Intifada, Norway’s position on Israel and Norwegian public
opinion
In 2002, during the course of the Second Intifada, the IDF launched a large-scale military
Operation named “Defensive Shield” in the West Bank. Soon after, Opinion conducted an
opinion poll for the leading broadsheet newspaper Aftenposten which revealed that 44% of
Norwegians felt the most sympathy with the Palestinians in the ongoing conflict while
only 9% had the greatest sympathy for Israel. Moreover, 68% of the respondents believed
that Israel should withdraw from the occupied territories on the West Bank and Gaza
Strip – a sharp increase from the 47% that were noted during a similar survey also con-
ducted by Opinion for Bergens Tidende in 1988. Thus events in the Middle East clearly
triggered a shift in Norwegians’ sympathy towards Palestinians. This was at a time
(between 2001 and 2005) when Norway had a centre-right coalition government with
the Christian Democrats (KrF or Kristelig Folkeparti), which was the party of the prime
minister. The KrF used to be a staunch supporter of Israel but developed a more balanced
stance, losing a fraction of the most right-wing supporters to FRP or Fremskrittspartiet,
the People’s Progress Party because of this), Høyre (Conservative party) and Venstre
(Liberal party which is a centre party).
At the official government level, during 2007, when the Norwegian Labour government
was in power, and when Jonas Gahr Støre was Foreign Minister, Norway deviated from its
constant support for Israel by recognizing the Hamas unity government after Hamas won
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the 2006 Palestinian elections for the second Palestinian Legislative Council or PLC and
the legislature of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). “It would be the height of
hypocrisy,” Støre said, “if we saluted the ballot box but refused its result. We must
accept the results of the ballot box. But we must also hold accountable any majority
which might emerge from elections. Any such majority must abide by international
human rights standards… The Palestinians are suffering a double tragedy – the tragedy
of living under occupation, and the tragedy of being divided. In 2007, we decided to
engage with the Palestinian national unity government. But the European Union made
the mistake of deciding not to engage. We in Norway are prepared to talk to all Palestinian
groups, including Hamas, even though we do not recognize its charter, which we find
deeply disturbing. We are in favour of Palestinian national reconciliation (Seale, 2012).”
This was a monumental moment when Norway proved its independence from other
major European interlocutors in the Middle East saga. In fact, it was the only
“Western” country, together with Switzerland, to do so at the time. This shift in policy
can be explained by Norway’s commitment to the principles of democracy. The 2006 elec-
tions in the OPTwere deemed to be the most transparent, free and fair elections in the
whole Arab world by the European Parliamentary election monitors (Pace & Pallister-
Wilkins, 2018). This conclusion effected public sympathy in Norway which also shifted
Government policy since the latter was true to reflecting the Norwegian majority’s
opinion. Støre’s policy was to engage with all actors, without necessarily endorsing their
policies. To engage was a key principle of the foreign policy of Norway’s centre-left gov-
ernment which came to power in 2005 and was re-elected in 2009. During this period,
Norway regularly warned Israel that if it refused to move forward with the political
process, it would face donor fatigue, and might itself, as the occupying power, have to
assume responsibility for the West Bank Palestinians. But Israel continued its relentless
seizure of Palestinian land while counting on foreign donors to continue to finance the
PNA.
On January 12, 2011, Jonas Gahr Støre (then Norway’s Foreign Minister) avowed that
Norway “could recognize the Palestinian state” and followed this up on 18 July when he
claimed that Norway was to recognize Palestine.
On 21 December 2012, MIFF (Med Israel for fred/"With Israel for Peace”) – which
keeps a regular track record of sympathy for and against Israel in Norway – quoted an
opinion poll (without actually specifying which “poll conducted by one of the major pro-
fessional Norwegian polling institutes” they had gained access to) and stipulated that only
14 percent of Norwegian youth believed that Israel really wants peace. MIFF also reported
that sympathy for Israel and the Palestinians varies across different parts of Norway. In
Sørlandet (southern Norway where the Middle East debate is much more polarized),
10% of the population polled had great sympathy for Israel (with a national average of
6 percent) while 9% had greater sympathy for the PA (with a national average of 5
percent) (MIFF, 2012). At the time of the quoted opinion poll (between 2005 and 2013)
Norway had a centre left coalition government composed of the AP (Labour party), the
Socialist Left party (SV or Sosialistisk Venstreparti) and the centre party (Sp or Senterpar-
tiet). Events in the oPt changed public opinion in Norway. The 2008 and 2012 wars in
Gaza as well as the work and reports that emerged from Norway’s civil society groups
played a role in exposing Israel’s continued violations of international law in the oPt
which in turn effected Norwegians’ opinion about the occupying power.
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Settlements, Gaza war 2014 and impact on Norwegian stance on
occupation
In a damning report published in 2013 entitled “Dangerous Liaisons. Norwegian Ties to
the Israel occupation”, the NGO Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) and the Norwegian
Union of Municipal and General Employees (Fagforbundet) expose how Norwegian auth-
orities (including municipalities) and companies – through financial investments and
trade – are complicit in activities that contribute to Israel’s violations of international
law and human rights in the occupied Palestinian territories. The said report goes
further to reveal how groups in Norway directly support the occupation through
money transfers to individual settlements that are illegal under international law. The
International Court of Justice (ICJ) has concluded that Israeli settlements in the occupied
Palestinian territory including East Jerusalem have been established in violation of inter-
national law.
Furthermore, the Government Pension Fund of Norway – Global (or GPFG: Norway’s
sovereign wealth fund) invested NOK 13,3 million in equities and NOK 11,3 million in
fixed assets in Israel (which is the fund’s largest investments in the Middle East region)
(see also Bahl, 2017). Moreover, the Israeli government, business sector and academia
look to Norway to learn lessons in managing oil and gas revenues and building an
energy industry. The report details how the Government Pension Fund of Norway –
Global (GPFG) and 13 private Norwegian banks and investment funds are implicated
in the occupation and related violations. Twelve such companies are considered to be par-
ticularly involved in serious violations, including: the building of key infrastructure in the
oPt, the provision of essential factors of production for the construction of settlements or
the Wall, as well as heavy machinery used to destroy Palestinian homes and infrastructure,
the extraction of non-renewable natural resources from occupied areas, and the develop-
ment and provision of technology and systems contributing to Israeli military control and
the restriction of freedom of movement. Israelis journalists have also reported on the
working environment legislation which is not enforced in the Israeli industrial zones in
the West Bank where many Palestinians work. It is often the case that Palestinian
workers receive too little pay. The Mishor Adumim industrial zone on the outskirts of
Jerusalem is one of the largest Israeli industrial zones in the West Bank. Mishor is linked
to the Ma’ale Adumim settlement, the third largest settlement in the West Bank. The
purpose of the project is to cut the link between Jerusalem and the West Bank by expanding
the industrial zone/settlement. Mishor has a lot of industry that produces waste that is hazar-
dous to the environment. SodaStream, the producer of home carbonating devices, had its
main factory in the Mishor Adumim industrial zone (it moved its production out of
Mishor in December 2015). The company sells its products to Norway. Mishor includes
other companies that the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global (SPU) owns
shares in: these include Mayer’s Cars and Trucks, the official representative of the Volvo
Group in Israel and Rami Levy and Shufersal, two supermarket chains (Moa, 2013, p. 22).
The report’s authors argue that these companies’ activities are in breach of GPFG
guidelines. Such reports leave a negative imprint amongst the general public in Norway
vis-à-vis Israel and its occupation of Palestinian land.
In July 2014, in a strongly worded message, Jonas Gahr Støre of Norway’s Labour Party,
Stefan Löfven of Sweden’s Social Democrats, Árni Páll Árnason of Iceland’s Social
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Democratic Alliance and Antti Rinne of Finland’s Social Democrats all added their names
to a letter which condemned Israel’s use of “disproportionate violence” during the 2014
Gaza war and called on Israel to end its blockade of Gaza and occupation of the West
Bank. This letter was initially meant to be a unified Nordic message but then Danish
Prime Minister (Social democrat) Helle Thorning Schmidt refused to sign (The Local
Denmark, 2014).
But this message again exposed the realities on the ground for Palestinians living under
Israeli military occupation to the scrutiny of the Norwegian public. It is therefore argued
there that Norway is actually de-coupling from itself with regard to Israel and especially on
the issue of Israeli settlements. In the main, Norwegian public opinion and civil society
would much rather align with and support the EU’s differentiation policy, in line with
UNSC 2334. (United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334 was adopted on 23
December 2016. It concerns the Israeli settlements in “Palestinian territories occupied
since 1967, including East Jerusalem”. The resolution states that Israel’s settlement activity
constitutes a “flagrant violation” of international law and has “no legal validity”. It
demands that Israel stop such activity and fulfil its obligations as an occupying power
under the Fourth Geneva Convention). However, the current Norwegian government,
made up of a right of centre coalition and which has been in power since September
2013, has instead enhanced cooperation with Israel with fewer strings attached than
what the EU differentiation policy calls for. This applies to new trade deals, gas explora-
tion, etc. This exposes how the Norwegian government’s policy no longer reflects the
opinion of the majority of the Norwegian public: a worrying trend that shows how
even long standing democracies can start to erode from within.
On 16 August 2017 the Palestine Committee of Norway published a report detailing the
various political parties’ responses to 8 questions set by this committee in cooperation with
the Joint Committee for Palestine. The Progress Party did not agree with the premise of
the questions and therefore chose to answer the questions without considering the
options provided. Their position on the recognition of a Palestinian state is that doing
so now will be devastating to the peace process. Moreover, the Frp holds that the areas
in which petroleum activities are conducted between Norway and Israel are not contested
by the party. The party holds that cooperation with Israel within the petroleum sector is
good for Norway. Furthermore the Frp’s position on the Government’s Global Pension
Fund which invests in Israel (including in settlements) continues because it provides a
good return for the Fund and thus favourable for the Norwegian economy: clearly the
Frp does not follow an ethical foreign and economic policy. Thus, on the one hand, the
FrP, the country’s third largest political party (a party which used to be highly bourgeois
but is now mostly charismatically Christian – an interesting shift given that there is very
little by way of overlap between the two groups)2 and a part of the centre-right govern-
ment coalitionseem to be home to the pro-Israel lobby.
On the other hand, at time of writing (2018), there seems to be an unequivocal and
fairly steady shift in Norwegian public opinion away from supporting Israel towards
seeing Israel as the oppressor of Palestinians, and as at least an equal if not more aggressive
part in the Middle East context generally. This would point to an increasing disconnect
between, on the one hand, the Norwegian government’s stance vis-à-vis Israel and, on
the other, the Norwegian public’s perception of the occupying power in the OPT.
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Norwegian government and public opinion on the occupation: a summary
analysis
The above being noted, it is important to observe that some differences between the parties
actually exist. In terms of the political parties in the Norwegian parliament there is today
only one clearly pro-Israel party – the Progress Party (FrP). In fact the FrP (right wing popu-
lists), aswell as parts of theChristianDemocratic party, are even pushing forNorway to follow
Trump’s example regarding the embassymove to Jerusalem. The two socialist parties, SV and
Rødt, advocate on the contrary an economic boycott of Israel. The SV called for a re-evalu-
ation of Norwegian policy towards Israel and Palestine, but the parliament voted against it.
Parts of the Labour Party advocate supporting the EU differentiation policy. The Labour
Party has gradually moved towards supporting the recognition of a Palestinian state (in
2015) evenwithout the existence of a peace agreement between the parties. Thiswas an impor-
tant step from the previous position – which was that the recognition of Palestine could only
be offered as a result of a negotiated peace agreement with Israel. However, the government
coalition, which includes FrP, sustains its support for “the goal of Israel and Palestine as two
states within secure and internationally recognized borders” (Government of Norway, 2018).
In terms of differences between some of the Nordic countries today, Sweden has taken
the step of recognizing Palestine as a state. As the Israeli government has often refused to
meet with Swedish representatives and denied Sweden access to Gaza (cf. Eriksson in this
special issue), the Swedish case is often used negatively in Norway as an example of why
rocking the boat is negative.
Conclusion
This contribution has sought to present the evolution of Norway’s ambiguous approach
towards Israel and the OPT.. In doing so it has been important to follow both the position
of Norwegian governments, politicians and political parties in power over time, as well as
public opinion. The point was made that events in the OPT have had an impact on the
change recorded over time in Norwegians’ perception about Israel as the occupying
power. At the government level, although Norway often deviated from the EU’s position
– as in 2006 when Norway recognized the Hamas government – what is more noticeable is
that Norway’s official policy does not always reflect the will of the majority of its popu-
lation. As has been shown, Norway’s public opinion and civil society would prefer their
country to support the EU’s differentiation policy which states that Israel’s settlement
activity is a clear violation of international law and demands that Israel stops such activity.
Yet, Israel continues to enjoy a very positive diplomatic relationship with Norway, just as it
did since its founding in 1948 (Waage, 2000).
In 2014 (one year after leaving office), the Labour Minister Espen Barth Eide declared
that alternatives to the EU’s much emphasised “two-state solution” should be considered,
implying that the solution might indeed be that of a one state (in Omvik & Fjeld, 2014).
But the current government from the political right (since 2013) has turned more pro-
Israel in its political rhetoric and action.
Another development worth noting is that during its latest congress in May 2017 the
Norwegian trade unions, LO, which is very close to the Labour Party, agreed on a
boycott of Israel, going against the policy of the Labour party (Grande, 2017).
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While seemingly ambiguous and at times contradictory, with Norway recognizing the
Palestinian national unity government in 2007 and with the government’s pension fund
divesting from three Israeli companies due to construction activity in East Jerusalem in
2014, Norway continues to expand its economic relations with Israel, as reports from
2013 and 2017 expose. It can thus be concluded that Norway’s unilateralism or its inde-
pendent line from the EU on issues relating to Israel (as in labelling of goods from settle-
ments) may well be a feature of changing governments, although the political line may
change.
Notes
1. Author communications with Jørgen Jensehaugen, 7th June 2018.
2. Discussions held by the author with Iver B Neumann and with Are Hovdenak, 6th June 2018.
See also Andersen and Bjørklund (1990).
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